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Legislation (nomothesia) 
Mirko Canevaro (The University of Edinburgh) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
From the earliest stages the Greeks understood the distinction between legislation and 
day-to-day administration. They gave laws a special status and often created specific, 
separate procedures to enact them. In the Archaic period specially appointed 
lawgivers were normally in charge of giving laws to the polis, and these laws were 
intended to be immutable, and their stability secured through entrenchment clauses. 
Making laws was not considered to be among the normal tasks of the government of 
the polis, and there were no standard procedures to change the laws once these had 
been given. Legislation was produced nevertheless, through the enactments of the 
sovereign Assemblies, but it was tacit and it was not accepted that the ancient laws of 
the lawgivers could be changed. This gave rise to significant problems of legitimacy, 
and introduced inconsistencies in the legal system of the polis, a problem that we can 
observe in fifth-century BCE Athens, until, at the end of the fifth century, the 
Athenians introduced judicial review to vet new legislation and avoid the introduction 
of inconsistencies, performed a revision of the laws of the city, and finally 
institutionalised a distinction between nomoi (laws: general permanent norms) and 
psephismata (decrees: ad hoc enactments). They also created a complex new 
procedure, involving a board of nomothetai, to allow the demos to make new laws and 
change the existing ones. Similar, yet not identical procedures are attested also 
outside Athens: Hellenistic kings often ordered the creation of special, one-off 
nomothetai or nomographoi to effect constitutional reform, and nomographoi or 
nomothetic lawcourts are attested in various city, with the task of ‘upgrading’ decrees 
of the demos into laws, and enter them among the laws of the city. 
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ESSAY 
 
Archaic lawmaking in Athens and beyond 
 
The first written law preserved from the Greek world comes from the Cretan polis of 
Drerus, and is dated to around 650 BCE.i Written laws are widely attested in Greece 
from the mid-seventh century BCE. This dating of the earliest written laws is 
confirmed by the literary tradition, which for many cities records (legendary) 
lawgivers (nomothetai) active from the mid-seventh century BCE (e.g. Arist. Pol. 
1274a): the most ancient of the Greek lawgivers was allegedly *Zaleucus* of 
Epizephirian Locri, active ca. 650 BCE, and the first of Athens’ lawgivers was 
*Draco*, whose action is traditionally dated to 621 BCE. Of course, the Greeks had 
customary rules, substantive norms of behaviour and social organisation, and 
connected procedures for judging inappropriate behaviour, before 650 BCE. These 
rules (often referred to in Homer as themistes) and procedures were oral in nature (see 
e.g. Hom. Il. 9.632–36 and the famous trial scene on Achilles’ shield at Hom. Il. 
19.497–508). Therefore, when the first laws were written down, we should not 
assume that this occurred in a vacuum, and that all the new laws would have covered 
areas previously unregulated. Lawmaking surely involved creating new norms, but it 
is likely that a large portion of it had to do with making clear, accessible and fixed 
what the law actually was.ii 
The inscriptional evidence suggests that, normally, written laws were individual 
enactments that covered one specific area. They certainly did not form a 
comprehensive ‘lawcode’ or constitute instances of ‘codification’.iii This however, 
does not mean that they were just ad hoc enactments dealing with specific crises and 
with no overarching principles behind them.iv  First, it is possible to find in archaic 
legislation, throughout the Greek world, both in the poetry of Solon and in many 
archaic laws preserved epigraphically, an overarching concern with preventing 
tyranny and the concentration of power in few hands (which is strikingly different 
from the image of lawgiving provided in Near-Eastern sources). The Greeks created 
laws that distributed powers and prerogatives among various boards of officials, 
political bodies, and sections of the population: Solon distributed powers and 
prerogatives among four property classes ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 7.3–4); a law from Chios 
(Koerner 1993, no. 61) grants different duties and responsibilities to various bodies 
and officials (cf. also Koerner 1993, no. 39, 74, 87). Archaic laws also establish term-
limits for magistrates (Koerner 1993, no. 77, 90, 121), impose penalties for 
magistrates that do not uphold the law (Koerner 1993, no. 31, 41), and often assign 
powers not to an individual but to a board to avoid its concentration. v  How 
widespread this concern is Archaic legislation shows that Archaic laws did not simply 
provide ad hoc solutions, but enforced wider substantive principles. 
Second, Solon’s legislation and the very existence of the *Gortyn Code* are evidence 
of extensive legislative efforts (involving both collecting and creating laws on a 
variety of matters) that cannot be explained in terms of piecemeal legislation to meet 
contingent needs. The laws of Solon mentioned at Plut. Sol. 20-4 include laws on 
neutrality, epikleroi, dowries, speaking ill of the dead and (in some contexts) the 
living, bequests, funerals, learning a trade and the obligation of sons to support their 
fathers, adultery, sacrificial victims, wells and the planting of trees, the export of 
agricultural products, injuries inflicted by animals, grants of citizenship to 
immigrants, public meals in the prytaneion.vi These are only a fraction of the laws that 
Solon must have enacted, and when such a body of law was produced, the aim must 
have been ‘not to solve a particular problem but to make available over a range of 
issues a statement of what the law was and how it was to be enforced’.vii 
The Greeks had a number of words to indicate a law: thesmos (from tithemi, with a 
focus on the laying down of the law); graphos and rhetra (with a focus on its written 
or oral nature); nomos (connected with nemein, ‘to distribute’, ‘to allocate’); and 
psephisma (normally translated as ‘decree’, referring to the act of voting with a 
psephos). Despite the different nuances of meaning, these terms could more or less be 
used interchangeably, and no one term was reserved to describing a general rule of 
permanent validity (what would later be called a nomos) as opposed to an ad hoc 
enactment part of day-to-day administration. And nevertheless, when legislation 
proper was produced (general rules meant to regulate individual behaviour and the 
organisation of the community), this was not conceived of as part of the normal 
business of the polis. The lawgivers of tradition were often outsiders, or became 
outsiders (and left) once their legislative activity was completed (cf. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 
7.3–4): Philolaus, the lawgiver of Thebes, was a Corinthian exile; Androdamas of 
Rhegium gave laws to the Chalcidians in Thrace; Solon left Athens for ten years.viii 
Legislation was a special activity and lawgivers were given special powers. Their 
condition of outsiders, or the need for them to leave and let the city administer 
independently their laws, was meant to avoid the formation of tyranny.  It was also 
meant (explicitly in the case of Solon: [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 7.2 and Plut. Sol. 25) to 
secure the stability of the laws and make sure that they could not be changed or 
repealed. This was a key concern of Archaic legislation, which was expressed with 
‘entrenchment clauses’: clauses that prescribed curses and terrible penalties for 
whoever deleted or changed a given law (e.g. van Effenterre-Ruzé 1994-5, no. 44, 
100).ix Similar rules are attested also in the literary record about the legendary 
lawgivers: Diod. Sic. 12.17 reports for instance that Charondas stipulated that 
whoever wanted to propose a revision of one of the existing laws should do so with 
his neck in a noose, and if the proposal were unsuccessful he should be hanged (cf. 
Dem. 24.139-41; Polyb. 12.16.9-14). These stories, although late and probably 
apocryphal, are confirmed in their wider meaning by the epigraphic evidence, and 
reveal that the Greeks, in the Archaic as well as in the Classical period, viewed 
legislation as a una tantum process accomplished by authoritative lawgivers who 
wrote down the laws forever, never to be annulled or changed. Their attitude is 
summarized by a passage in which the Anonymous of Iamblicus (Vit. Pit. 256), 
borrowing the formulation from the Pythagorical Sentences of Aristoxenus, states that 
the Pythagoreans ‘considered just to stay faithful to the ancestral customs and norms, 
even if slightly inferior to those of others, because to abandon easily the existing laws 
and to be inclined to introduce innovations would be neither convenient nor useful’.x 
Athens was no different, and Dem. 23.62 reports the entrenchment clause of Draco’s 
homicide law. As for Solon, although there is no evidence of entrenchment clauses for 
his legislation, both [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 7.2 and Plut. Sol. 25 inform us that he bound the 
Athenians to keep to his laws by making them swear an oath (apparently in advance: 
Hdt. 1.29.2). Solon therefore effectively entrenched his laws, and later Athenians 
understood his intention as such. Solon moreover was asked, and elected by the 
Athenians, to give them laws, and there is no sign that they approved his laws 
afterwards. The authority of the laws derived from the authoritative action of the 
nomothetes. This conception of the authoritative lawgiver had important 
consequences. The Athenians, as early as the fifth century BCE, saw Draco and Solon 
as the authors of their laws (e.g. Cratinus dr. 274 Kock; Ar. Nub. 1187; Av. 1660). 
Because of this, they had an institutionalized understanding that the laws should not 
be changed; viewed them as separate from the day-to-day administration of the polis, 
and therefore outside the scope of the action of the normal governmental bodies; they 
saw them as the province of specially appointed nomothetai acting at special times; 
finally, despite the fact that Solon’s laws were not strictly speaking a ‘code’, the 
Athenians understood them as part of system, the product of a unified rationality, and 
therefore consistent and coherent (see e.g. Antiph. 5.14-15, 6.2; Ar. Nub. 1187; 
Aesch. Eum. 690-5, 1113-14). 
 
The reforms of late fifth-century BCE Athens 
 
Throughout the fifth century, the Athenians progressively came to realise that, despite 
their ideas about the immutability of the laws, legislation was necessary and was in 
fact enacted in the Assembly, as part of the normal business, even in the absence of 
legitimate procedures for normal legislation (e.g. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.1, 22.5, 26.2, 
26.4, 47.1). These enactments however were not recognised as on the same level as 
those of Solon, and the Athenians did not accept that many of them in fact 
contradicted the laws of Solon.xi They still believed that the laws of Solon were 
unchangeable and unchanged, despite the fact that their day-to-day activity in the 
Assembly introduced new rules that sometimes tacitly contradicted the ancestral laws. 
The result of such legislation was that the laws became progressively inconsistent, 
and liable to charges of illegitimacy by anti-democrats. In the last years of the fifth 
century the Athenians attempted to deal with these problems. The first procedure they 
created for this purpose was the graphe paranomon, a public action against illegal 
decrees. We know only a few cases of this procedure before the fourth century BCE – 
the earliest evidence is Andoc. 1.17, 22, who refers to a successful graphe paranomon 
brought in 415 by Leagoras of Cydathenaeum against Speusippus for a decree enacted 
by the Council.  
The basic procedural steps in the fifth century BCE were the following: 1) during the 
discussion of a proposal or after it had been approved (Xen. Hell. 1.7.12-14; Dem. 
22.5, 9-10) anyone among the Athenians could indict the bill for being paranomon; 2) 
the accuser had to swear that the decree was illegal (hypomosia) and later 3) present a 
written text to the thesmothetai explaining why the decree was illegal, citing as 
supporting evidence the statutes that prove that it is illegal; 4) if one dropped the case 
after the hypomosia he was fined 1,000 drachmas and was forbidden to bring any 
public actions in the future; 5) the same happened if the accuser failed to receive one 
fifth of the votes at the trial; 6) the case was judged by a panel of at least 500 judges 
and possibly as many as 6,000 (Andoc. 1.17); 7) if the accusation was successful, the 
decree was repealed if already enacted, or could not be enacted at all if it had been 
indicted before the vote in the Assembly; 8) if the proposal had not been approved by 
the Assembly before being indicted and the prosecution was unsuccessful, the 
proposal went back to the Assembly for approval; 9) if less than one year had elapsed 
since the presentation of the bill (Dem. 23.104), the proposer could  be given any 
penalty from a small fine to death or full atimia (Hyp. Eux. 18; [Dem.] 58.1).xii 
In the fifth century, before the distinction between nomoi and psephismata was 
introduced (see below), the aim of the procedure was to provide for the repealing of 
new enactments that contradicted existing laws. It was a first attempt to secure the 
consistency of the laws of the city while accepting the legitimacy of the enactments of 
the demos. This procedure, however, had one important weakness: it could not deal 
with inconsistencies retroactively. Moreover, it was unacceptable to the oligarchs in 
the city that argued that only the laws enacted once and for all by special nomothetai 
were legitimate, and the enactments of the demos were not. Accordingly, in the course 
of their oligarchic revolutions, they styled themselves as special nomothetai or 
syngrapheis autokratores ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 29.2; Thuc. 8.97.2) and attempted to 
eliminate the problem: the Thirty for instance took down from the Areopagus the laws 
of Ephialtes and Archestratus, and rescinded laws that gave rise to disagreements 
([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 35.2); a provision of the ‘Constitution for the present’ discussed at 
[Arist.] Ath. Pol. 31.3 in connection with the Four Hundred (of 411) orders that a new 
Council of 400 must follow the new laws and will not be allowed to change them or 
enact others. Their action shows that that their model of lawmaking was the archaic 
one, and they rejected any authority of the demos to make laws. 
Both restorations of democracy, in 410 and 403 BCE, also dealt with these issues, 
with more successful solutions.xiii The restored democracy in 410 began the process of 
republishing the ‘laws of Solon’. The most important source for this procedure is 
Lysias’ Against Nicomachus (30.2-5), corroborated by the republished law of Draco 
(IG I3 104). The speech attacks Nicomachus in his role as anagrapheus of the nomoi. 
His job (as member of a panel of anagrapheis) was finding the laws of the city (not 
just those of Solon), submitting them to the demos for approval or rejection, and then 
publishing them in front of the Stoa of the King (cf. Andoc. 1.81). The procedure, 
which was meant to last only four months, took six years, was interrupted by the 
Thirty, and resumed in 403/2 BCE, amounted to a total re-examination and re-
approval of the laws by the demos.xiv With it, the democrats claimed the laws of 
Draco and Solon for themselves against the oligarchic attempts to appropriate them. 
They also dealt for the first time retroactively with their inconsistencies. In doing this, 
they recognized that statutes from different periods (and not just those of Draco and 
Solon) can be valid, and confirmed their validity through a vote of the demos, which 
thereby affirmed its right to legislate.  
This was however an una tantum procedure, which did not provide any rules of 
change for the future. In 403, after the overthrow of the Thirty and the restoration of 
democracy, the Athenians created such rules of change and placed the nomoi on a 
more solid legal foundation. The main source for these reforms is Andocides (1.81-
9).xv who states that after democracy was restored the Athenians elected a commission 
of twenty to govern the city until laws could be enacted, and established that until 
then the thesmoi of Draco and the nomoi of Solon were to be valid. Members of the 
Council were eventually selected by lot, and the Assembly elected nomothetai. 
Afterwards the Athenians also voted to resume the scrutiny of the laws. These were 
two separate procedures: one resumed the scrutiny and republication of the laws 
initiated in 410, the other appointed special nomothetai, with a role akin to that of 
Solon or Draco, to create new laws. Andocides (1.85-9) discusses some of the laws 
that these specially appointed nomothetai created: some of them dealt with the 
aftermath of the civil war, others with future legislation. One of them provides that ‘it 
is not allowed for magistrates to use an unwritten (agraphos) nomos not even about a 
single matter’ – a basic rule that orders public officials to perform their tasks 
following the instructions of the written laws of the city, and not according to custom 
or to other principles. Another provision states that ‘no decree, neither of the Council 
nor of the Assembly, is to have more authority than a law’. This law introduces for 
the first time a clear-cut distinction between nomoi and psephismata, as well as 
hierarchy between the two: nomoi are higher rules that can overturn, but cannot be 
overturned by, psephismata. Once this rule was passed, the Athenians respected this 
distinction very strictly, and no longer used nomos and psephisma interchangeably 
(see below).xvi Another provision (Andoc. 1.89; cf. Dem. 23.86, 218; 24.18, 59, 116, 
188; [Dem.] 46.2) defines (negatively) what a nomos is: ‘It is not permitted to enact a 
law directed against an individual unless the same law applies to all Athenians’.xvii In 
accordance with the definitions we find in Arist. Pol. 1292a 32-7 and Eth. Nic. 1137b 
13-14, this provision indicates that a nomos must have a general content and apply to 
all, whereas psephismata deal with particular cases. A further law (Dem. 24.42: the 
law of Diocles) defines from what time laws are to be in force, forbidding retroactive 
legislation and laying down the principle that laws are meant to be valid forever.xviii 
Finally, the special nomothetai of 403 proceeded to institutionalize legal change by 
creating a complex procedure of nomothesia for nomoi (as opposed to psephismata) 
to be enacted and amended.xix The main sources for this procedure are Dem. Tim. and 
Lept., supplemented by Aeschin. 3.38-40 and a few inscriptions (see below).xx The 
procedure worked as follows: 1) in order to introduce a new law, a probouleuma had 
to be approved by the Council, introducing a vote in the Assembly about whether new 
laws could be proposed; 2) following the probouleuma, a preliminary vote in the 
Assembly, at any point of the year, had to be held that would allow new laws to be 
proposed (Dem. 24.25; IG II2 333, IG II3 320, IG II2 140); 3) once new proposals 
had been authorized by the Assembly, all new proposals had to be posted in front of 
the monument of the Eponymous Heroes (Dem. 24.25; 20.94), so that anybody could 
see them; 4) the proposals had to be read out by the secretary at each meeting of the 
Assembly until the appointment of the nomothetai, to allow everyone to make up their 
minds (Dem. 20.94); 5) in the third meeting of the Assembly after the preliminary 
vote, on the basis of the proposals submitted, the people had to discuss the 
appointment (or summons) of nomothetai and pass a decree of appointment (or 
summons; Dem. 24.25; 20.92); 6) opposing laws however had to be repealed before 
the new laws could be enacted by the nomothetai (Dem. 24.32, 34–5; Dem. 20.93); 7) 
presumably at the same meeting of the Assembly that appointed the nomothetai, 
expert synegoroi (advocates) were elected to defend those laws whose repeal was 
necessary for enacting the new laws (Dem. 24.36; 20.146); 8) if the proposer of a new 
law violated any of these rules, anyone could bring him to trial through a graphe 
nomon me epitedeion theinai (a public charge for enacting an inexpedient law; Dem. 
24.32), and if the case was heard within a year after the enactment of the law, the 
punishment could be anything the court decided, from a small fine to atimia or death. 
The creation of this procedure, of the new distinction between nomoi and 
psephismata, and of the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai, also changed the scope 
of the old graphe paranomon. The two procedures were similar, but from this point 
on the graphe paranomon could no longer be used against any proposal, but only 
against new psephismata that were not consistent with one or more of the existing 
nomoi. Conversely, the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai was concerned with 
nomoi that contradicted existing ones or had not been enacted following the correct 
procedures, and could be used both against new laws (either enacted or just proposed) 
or against old laws that needed to be repealed before a new law could be enacted by 
the nomothetai. 
 
Athenian nomothesia in the fourth century BCE 
 
Throughout the fourth century BCE, until Macedon’s victory in the Lamian War, the 
Athenians strictly followed the new procedures for nomothesia created in the late fifth 
century BCE: general rules valid forever were normally enacted as nomoi by the 
nomothetai through the new nomothesia procedure; decrees were enacted by the 
Council or the Assembly.xxi The distinction was enshrined in the enactment formulas 
of the prescripts: in psephismata we find formulas such as ‘it was resolved / it should 
be resolved by the people / by the Council’ (edoxe / dedochthai toi demoi / tei boulei); 
in nomoi formulas such as ‘it was resolved / it should be resolved by the nomothetai 
(edoxe / dedochthai tois nomothetais). There are ten fourth-century nomoi preserved 
on stone from Athens, and all conform to this pattern (SEG 26.72; Stroud 1998; 
Agora Excavations, inv. no. I 7495 (unpublished); IG II2 140; IG II2 244; IG II3 320; 
IG II3 447; IG II3 445; IEleusis 138; to these one should add SEG 52.104, cf. 
Canevaro 2013c). Three more inscriptions appear at first glance not to respect this 
distinction, but in fact conform to it (IG II3 452, IG II3 327, IG II3 355). They order 
that, at the next session of the nomothetai, particular sums of money should be 
assigned to a particular magistrate for the purpose of funding particular honours, so 
they do not constitute a general rule with permanent validity. And yet the allocation of 
the funds of the city was regulated by a nomos, the merismos (allocation of the 
budget). Because no psephisma was more binding than a nomos, the only legitimate 
way to change the allocation was through a nomos.  
The complex procedure of nomothesia appears to have discouraged frivolous 
legislation: inscriptions preserve around 800 decrees for the fourth century BCE, but 
only 10 laws. On the other hand, this difference can be explained in two ways. First, 
the enactment of general permanent rules would have occurred much less often than 
ad hoc measures for the day-to-day administration of the polis; second, the epigraphic 
habit meant that honorary decrees were more frequently inscribed than other 
measures. A passage in Demosthenes’ speech Against Timocrates (24.142) criticizes 
the Athenians for passing too many laws, claiming that they enacted laws almost ten 
times a year. Even allowing for rhetorical exaggeration, this passage provides 
evidence of numerous sessions of the nomothetai, each session considering multiple 
proposals. Other evidence for legislation in Athens comes from the speeches of the 
orators delivered in, or referring to, cases of graphe paranomon and graphe nomon 
me epitedeion theinai. There is evidence for thirty-five graphe paranomon cases in 
the fourth century BCE, but for only six graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai cases.xxii 
Although the number of public actions against nomoi is much lower, they are more 
than the epigraphic evidence would lead us to expect. The Athenians clearly used the 
new nomothesia procedure quite often. 
Despite the fact that the Athenians normally followed the correct procedures, such a 
large amount of legislation must have occasionally given rise to infractions. The case 
against the law of Timocrates (Dem. Tim.) is a notable example: in 354/3 Timocrates 
introduced a law that allowed public debtors who failed to pay what they owed on 
time to avoid prison by presenting sureties. Demosthenes wrote a speech for a certain 
Diodorus, who brought the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai against the law, in 
which he alleges (with good evidence) that Timocrates did not respect the prescribed 
times for legislating: he was authorised by the Assembly to propose legislation, but 
then scheduled a session of nomothetai for the very next day (instead of waiting for 
the third Assembly meeting), and did not post his proposal at the monument of the 
Eponymous Heroes.xxiii In this speech, as well as in the other extant speech for a 
graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai, Demosthenes’ Against Leptines, the prosecutors 
paint a picture of unscrupulous politicians enacting more laws than decrees, not 
paying any attention to maintaining the coherence of the legal system, and bypassing 
the correct procedures. One should not take their statements at face value: these are 
prosecution speeches against new laws and their proposers, not the statements of an 
impartial source. The picture would be very different if we had the speeches made by 
those defending the laws, or the speeches delivered by the proposers when they first 
introduced their bills. As we have seen, the epigraphic evidence shows that nomoi 
were normally passed in accordance with the correct procedures, and that the volume 
of new legislation was significant but not excessive. In fact, the speeches Against 
Timocrates and Against Leptines are themselves evidence that when the correct 
procedures were not followed, the violation of the law was detected and prosecuted. 
The main argument used by Demosthenes against a new law is that it contradicts 
previous laws, which the defendant failed to repeal before enacting his own law (e.g. 
Dem. 24.142). Often the argument is even broader, showing that the new law 
contradicts the general spirit of the laws of the city. This view is predicated on the 
assumption that the laws of Athens were rationally organized and coherent partly 
through the conscious intention of the original lawgiver and partly as a result of the 
nomothesia procedure that preserved this coherence. It is clear that the consistency 
and coherence of the legal system remained a goal of the Athenian democracy 
because at some point in the fourth century BCE the Athenians created an additional 
procedure that assigned to specific magistrates the task of investigating the existing 
laws and identifying contradictions between statutes. These contradictions had to be 
submitted to the nomothetai, who would choose one provision against the other and 
restore the consistency of the laws (Dem. 20.91 and Aeschin. 3.38-9).xxiv Inscriptions 
also provide evidence for this concern about consistency: e.g. the law of Nicophon 
(SEG 26.72, ll. 55-6) prescribes that the enactments that contradict the new law 
should be physically destroyed. 
The new legislative procedures gave the demos the power to enact new laws 
whenever necessary and appropriate throughout the fourth century. At the same time, 
the new procedures helped to preserve the consistency of the laws of the city and to 
protect them against hasty and ill-considered legal changes. They provided clear rules 
of change and procedures for judicial review of new laws, at the same time banning 
retroactive legislation and securing a degree of stability for the legal system.  
These procedures did not however survive the Athenian defeat in the *Lamian War* 
(322 BCE).xxv It was probably *Antipater* who dissolved the lawcourts and abolished 
these procedures. Later *Demetrius of Phalerum* styled himself nomothetes in the 
tradition of the archaic lawgivers, and prevented the demos from making laws through 
the creation of nomophylakes (guardians of the law) who could block legislation in 
the Assembly and in the Council.xxvi  When Athens was ‘freed’ by *Demetrius 
Poliorcetes* in 307 (Diod. Sic. 20.45.5, 46.3), in order to restore the democratic 
constitution the Athenians appointed nomothetai, and yet these were not the normal 
panels of nomothetai typical of the fourth-century procedure, but rather a specially 
appointed board whose role was akin to that of the nomothetai of the late fifth 
century, and which was closely linked with Demetrius.xxvii There is no evidence for 
nomothetai in Athens after Demetrius’ expulsion in 301. It is likely that after 301 the 
Athenians passed laws in the same way as they passed decrees: through a simple vote 
of the Assembly. 
 
Evidence for lawmaking beyond Athens 
 
Despite the lack of a specific procedure of nomothesia to enact nomoi (as opposed to 
psephismata) in Athens from the third century on, the Athenians still preserved the 
view that nomoi were general permanent rules whereas psephismata were ad hoc 
measures. Magistrates and politicians were regularly praised in Athens for behaving 
in accordance with both the nomoi and the psephismata of the city (e.g. IG II2 404; 
674; 776; 1006; 1028; Agora 16.261 l. 1), and the distinction between the two is even 
found in the language of by-laws passed by private associations, which tend to refer to 
general norms as nomoi (e.g. IG II2 1275 ll. 12-17). Because this distinction is found 
even in the absence of distinct procedures, one must be careful not to assume that a 
community had a separate procedure for enacting laws as at Athens simply because 
their documents contain the different terms nomos and psephisma. Thus, for instance, 
the mention in IG XII 8, 51 ll. 2-6 (II c. BCE) of both terms cannot be taken by itself 
to indicate the existence in Imbros of separate procedures for enacting laws and 
decrees and of a clear hierarchy between the two (cf. also e.g. I.Kaunos 19, IG XII 7, 
406). But it is evidence that the Imbrians had a general notion of the different 
meanings of nomos and psephisma.xxviii 
In the same way, evidence for procedures akin to the Athenian graphe paranomon in 
a community does not necessarily indicate that nomoi and psephismata were enacted 
by different procedures in that community, and were entirely distinct. Such 
procedures are attested for instance in a decree in honour of foreign judges sent by 
Heracleia to Demetrias (SEG 23.405, I/II c. CE): their job was to give a verdict about 
a decree that had been indicted as paranomon – of course, in this case, the charge of 
illegality was decided not by popular judges, but by *foreign judges* (cf. also Polyb. 
28.7.1-15). Another decree from Mylasa (I.Labraunda 56 ll. 2-3, early Imperial) 
speaks of dikai arising from a paranomon decree. This evidence shows that judicial 
review of measures passed by the polis was widespread in the Greek world and that a 
concern for the consistency and coherence of legal measures was also common. But it 
is unclear whether these cases presuppose the existence of a formal hierarchy between 
nomoi and psephismata. It is more likely that these procedures were similar to the 
Athenian graphe paranomon in the fifth century BCE, by which psephismata are 
‘contrary to the law’ if they contradict existing psephismata that have not been 
repealed. This is in fact the situation envisioned in four Hellenistic decrees from 
Magnesia on the Meander (I.Magnesia 92a ll. 13-14; 92b ll. 18-19; 94 ll. 12-13; 
I.Priene 61 ll. 30-31; III/II c. BCE), which state that if a previous decree is 
inconsistent with the one now enacted, that should make the previous decree 
invalid.xxix 
Where a clear hierarchy of enactments existed, the higher authority of laws was 
enforced in a variety of ways.xxx One method was through entrenchment clauses (see 
above; see IG XII 2, 645b ll. 23-58 for a Hellenistic example). Another was through 
the appointment of special boards of lawmakers who gave laws to the city at 
particular, critical, junctures. This is the method prescribed in several royal 
diagrammata: for instance, *Alexander* in 334 sent a diagramma instructing the 
Chians to elect nomographoi who would write and correct (grapsousi kai 
diorthosousi) the laws to effect a change in regime (Chios 32). The same arrangement 
was imposed between 306 and 302 by *Antigonus* on the Teans and the Lebedians 
(Teos 59): he ordered that the Teans and Lebedians should elect three nomographoi 
each, who should swear an oath and then write (that is, propose) the laws that they 
considered most expedient and fair to both cities for the new synoecized city within 
six months from their election. They should submit their proposals for laws to the 
demos for ratification. If a citizen wanted to propose a law, he had to submit it to the 
nomographoi, who would then submit it to the Assembly, together with those of their 
own making. The laws about which the demos disagreed had to be sent to Antigonus 
himself for review and approval.  
*Ptolemy I* appears to have also imposed a similar board in his diagramma to 
Cyrene in 322/1 BCE (SEG 9.1), but in this case the special lawmakers were called 
nomothetai, not nomographoi.xxxi  The two nomographoi of the Aetolian League 
mentioned by Polyb. 13.1.2, as well as the third-century BCE diorthotai of Gonnus in 
Thessaly (Gonnoi 112), are also probably examples of specially appointed lawmakers. 
This form of nomothesia resembles that of the Athenian ‘special’ nomothetai of 403 
and of 307 BCE , and its model is the action of archaic nomothetai such as Solon (see 
above). In other cases we find traces of standard (not special) procedures for 
separating enactments of a higher level from more regular enactments. These are 
comparable with, yet not identical to, Athenian nomothesia in the fourth century BCE. 
Sometimes the evidence shows that enactments meant to have higher validity were 
recorded in specific places: for instance in Aegiale on Amorgus laws were recorded 
on special tablets (deltoi, IG XII 7, 515; II c. BCE). Where this happened, it usually 
required further approval of the enactment by a specific board: for instance, a decree 
of Hermione that recognises rules about a festival must be written among the laws by 
nomographoi (IG IV 679; III/II c. BCE); a decree from Megalopolis recognising the 
festival of Artemis Leucophryene at Magnesia requires nomographoi to record the 
decree among the laws (I.Magnesia 38, III/II c. BCE; cf. also I.Magnesia 28 of 
Kalydon, ca. 206 BCE); another decree from Samos (of Cephallenia) enacted for the 
same purpose is to be placed among the laws by the magistrates and the nomographoi 
(I.Magnesia 35, III/II c. BCE). The role played by the nomographoi in these 
inscriptions is performed in a decree from Kyme by a ‘nomothetic lawcourt’ 
(nomothetikon dikasterion, I.Kyme 12 with SEG 47.1660; II c. BCE) to which a 
designated introducer of the law (Erybothon) needs to submit the decree.  At 
Demetrias this same role, that of making a decree into a law, is assigned in an 
inscription to the elected strategoi and to the nomophylakes (IG IX 2, 1109 ll. 91-3; II 
c. BCE). 
One should however note that in all these cases the specific procedure, as well as the 
participation of the nomographoi, of the nomophylakes, or of the nomothetikon 
dikasterion, does not mean that decrees and laws are two entirely separate and 
incommensurable categories as they were at Athens. On the contrary, all these 
measures were enacted first by the Council or the Assembly as regular decrees, and 
were then ‘upgraded’ into laws by a special procedure. The distinction was not as 
stark as in Athens, where in the fourth century BCE nomoi and psephismata were 
enacted through entirely separate procedures, and laws could not be enacted as 
decrees, and vice versa. An inscription from Corcyra however may suggest a starker 
distinction between laws and decrees, with a more separate procedure. In this 
inscription, the participation of the city in the festival at Magnesia is approved by two 
separate enactments: the decree inscribed here, and a further law to be drafted by 
elected nomothetai who will then proceed to enter it among the (sacred) laws 
(I.Magnesia 44 ll. 34-6; III/II c. BCE). 
Whatever the exact roles of these sessions of nomographoi, nomophylakes, 
nomothetai, of the nomothetikon dikasterion, they probably met at particular times 
and in accordance with precise procedures as they did at Athens: for instance, a 
decree from Cnidus about the participation of the city in the festival of Artemis 
Leucophryene at Magnesia states that the nomographoi shall introduce these 
decisions among the laws following the schedule specified in the laws (I.Magnesia 56 
ll. 31-3). And two decrees, one of the Acarnanian League (IG IX I2 2, 583 ll. 75-7; 
216 BCE) and one of Corcyra (IG IX I, 694 ll. 137-9; before 229 BCE) prescribe that 
changes to the laws should be made when specific sessions take place (respectively, a 
nomothesia session, and a diorthosis ton nomon session, conducted by diorthotores). 
In all these different poleis, the hierarchy between measures, the different procedures 
to enact them, and the bodies in charge of proposing and approving them, were set out 
by particular laws. 
 
DISCUSSION OF THE LITERATURE 
 
The study of Athenian lawmaking throughout the Archaic and Classical age 
(nomothesia) has been a popular one, and it is impossible in this context to provide a 
full account of the history of the study of this subject. This section will provide only a 
few references to influential works, starting with diachronic accounts of the 
development of Athenian democracy and laws that are particularly concerned with 
legislation. It will then proceed to discuss particular works on specific aspects of 
Athenian and Greek legislative practices.  
Many scholars believe that at the end of the fifth century, with the revision of the laws 
and the creation of the nomothetai, Athens moved from a radical democracy where 
the people in the Assembly were in charge of legislation to a more moderate regime 
founded on the rule of law, where legislation resided with a separate body, often 
identified with a special session of judges who had sworn the Judicial Oath. This 
point of view, with different emphases and in different frameworks, has been often 
stated, and its most influential formulation is to be found in Ostwald 1986. Ostwald 
does not concentrate only on procedural matters, and paints a wider picture of the 
intellectual and institutional context of Athenian democracy's passage 'from popular 
sovereignty to the sovereignty of law'. Against this reconstruction, Sealey 1987 
stresses the continuity of Athenian conceptions of the rule of law, which is, in his 
opinion, what in fact fourth-century BCE Athenians intended by democracy. He uses 
legislative practices as an example among others of such continuity. Neither author 
focuses specifically on legislative practices, although these play a considerable role in 
their arguments.  
Particularly important for defining the continuity of democratic ideology and 
institutions as a constant attempt to achieve both democracy and the rule of law is 
Harris 2006, in particular the essay 'Solon and the Spirit of the Law in Archaic and 
Classical Greece'. This essay discusses Archaic Greek lawgiving and traces back to 
Solon a consistent conception of the rule of law that informs institutional 
development in various aspects of the running of the Greek poleis in the following 
centuries, and in particular points out how Archaic lawmaking separated legislation 
from administration, and intended its activity as a bulwark against tyranny. In 
particular Harris builds on Lewis 1997 to highlight the role of entrenchment clauses in 
early legislation down to the 5th century, and stresses the importance of distributing 
power among various bodies of officials, as well as securing their accountability. 
Koerner 1993 and van Effenterre-Ruzé 1994-1995 are extensive collections of archaic 
laws, and Rhodes-Leão 2015 is a new and up-to-date collection of the fragments of 
Solon’s laws. 
Much work has been done in the last fifty years on the more technical aspects of 
Athenian legislative procedure, yet historians have often relied on sources, like the 
documents in the speeches of the orators, that should not be considered reliable 
(Canevaro 2013a). The procedures graphe paranomon and graphe nomon me 
epitedeion theinai have been studied extensively in their most juridical aspects in 
Wolff 1970. His explanation of these procedures in terms of Normenkontrolle has 
been contextualized in the overall political system by Hansen 1974. Hansen reads 
these procedures as examples of judicial review of legislation. The revision of the 
'code' of laws at the end of the fifth-century has been surveyed in many articles, and 
no consensus has been reached (due, probably, to the use of unreliable documents as 
key evidence, see Canevaro- Harris 2012). Some recent works on these topics are 
Joyce 2008, Shear 2011 and Carawan 2013. A series of excellent contributions by 
Hansen (1983, 161-205) has however at least successfully defined the distinction 
between nomoi (laws) and psephismata (decrees) instituted at the end of the 5th 
century.  
Fourth-century nomothesia has also been the object of much scholarship, with the 
most important works being MacDowell 1975, who first believed in a development of 
the procedure also in the 4th century, Hansen 1985 who tried to provide a unified 
account of 4th century practices, and Rhodes 1985, who corrects MacDowell and 
Hansen in many respects. The most up-to-date discussions of these issues, which 
present a new reconstruction of the procedures (and also reject some spurious 
documents) is Canevaro 2013b. Canevaro 2015 provides a general overview of the 
development of Athenian legislative procedures from the Archaic period to the late-
fourth century. Canevaro 2013c follows the development of the procedures into the 
early-Hellenistic period. 
There are no comprehensive studies of the procedures of lawmaking outside Athens. 
Some discussion of such procedures can be found in Rhodes with Lewis 1997, 497-9 
and Velissaropoulos-Karakostas 2011, 49-109. Habicht 2008 discusses the extra-
Athenian evidence for judicial review and graphe paranomon. 
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i Koerner 1993, no. 90 = van Effenterre-Ruzé 1994-5, no. 81. Koerner 1993 and van 
Effenterre-Ruzé 1994-5 are the two standard collections of Archaic Greek laws, and 
will be used throughout this section. 
ii See e.g. Rhodes- Leão 2015, 6. 
iii Against any understanding of Archaic legislation as ‘codification’ see Hölkeskamp 
1999. 
iv Hölkeskamp 1999: 263–264. 
v For these anti-tyrannical concerns in Archaic laws and the methods to avoid 
concentration of power see Harris 2006, 3-39, with plenty of examples. 
vi See now Rhodes-Leão 2015 for a collection of the evidence for Solon’s law that 
takes into account the most recent scholarship. 
vii Rhodes- Leão 2015, 2. 
viii See Harris 2006, 11-12 for more examples. 
ix On entrenchment clauses and their function see Lewis 1997, 136-49 and Harris 
2006, 22-5. 
x See Canevaro 2015 for a more extensive discussion. 
xi See Canevaro 2015 for more sources and more evidence. 
xii For discussion of graphe paranomon see Wolff 1970 and Hansen 1974. See 
*graphe* for further information on Athenian public charges. 
xiii The scholarship on the democratic restorations is enormous. See in particular Joyce 
2008, Shear 2011, Carawan 2013, and Canevaro-Harris 2012: 110-16. 
xiv For the sources, and the technicalities of this procedure, see Canevaro-Harris 2012, 
110-16. 
xv The documents inserted in the section are however forgeries and one needs to rely 
on the orator’s paraphrase. For a discussion of the documents and of Andocides’ 
narrative see Canevaro-Harris 2012. 
xvi This distinction has been studied and tested in Hansen 1983, 161-205. 
xvii See Canevaro-Harris 2012, 117-19 and Canevaro 2013a, 145-150. 
xviii On the law of Diocles see Canevaro 2013a, 121-7. 
xix For the attribution of the new nomothesia procedures to the special nomothetai of 
403 see Canevaro 2015. 
xx Dem. Tim. contains documents that purport to be the actual laws on nomothesia, 
and have been the basis of most scholarly reconstructions of the procedure (most 
notably MacDowell 1975; Rhodes 1985; Hansen 1985). Canevaro 2013b shows that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
these documents are later forgeries and unreliable, and the reconstruction provided 
here follows that offered in this study. 
xxi Hansen 1983, 179-205 shows that the only derogations to this rule are found in the 
years 340-38 right before and after the battle of Chaeronea, when Athens was in fatal 
danger and therefore correct procedure was occasionally dropped. 
xxii See the catalogue of Hansen 1974. 
xxiii On this speech and the procedure see Canevaro 2013b. 
xxiv Dem. 20.91 attributes the task to specially elected commissioners, while Aeschin. 
3.38-9 attributes it to the thesmothetai. It is unclear whether the task was transferred 
to them at some point (MacDowell 1975, 72 and Rhodes 1985: 60), or commissioners 
and thesmothetai worked together (Hansen 1985, 356). 
xxv For an account of the developments of nomothesia in the late fourth and early third 
centuries BCE, see Canevaro 2013c. 
xxvi See Canevaro 2013c, 66-9. 
xxvii See Canevaro 2013c, 69-79. 
xxviii See Rhodes with Lewis 1997, 498-9. Velissaropoulos-Karakostas 2011, I, 60-3 is 
too quick to assume that the mention of nomoi and psephismata can automatically be 
mapped into a distinction and hierarchy identical to that of fourth-century Athens. 
xxix On the graphe paranomon outside Athens see Habicht 2008. 
xxx See for discussions of different procedures Rhodes with Lewis 1997, 497-9 and 
Velissaropoulos-Karakostas 2011, I, 60-87. 
xxxi On the royal diagrammata see Velissaropoulos-Karakostas 2011, I, 63-6, 
Canevaro 2013c, 77-9 with further references. 
